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Abstract 
 
This theoretical paper investigates international risk sharing and its implications for equity 
home bias. A general equilibrium model, featuring two closed economies with nontrivial 
production sectors, is developed. Moreover, productivity contains a small but persistent highly 
correlated long run risk that becomes the major determinant of the intertemporal marginal 
rate of substitution (IMRS) in a model with the recursive preferences. Despite adopting the 
model of closed economies and autarkic asset holdings—a scenario leading to the lowest level 
of international risk sharing under the same conditions—our model is still able to generate 
international risk sharing indexes always over 96% for a broad range of parameter values, 
excepting two cases: where the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) is the reciprocal 
of the relative risk aversion (RRA); and where EIS is around 0.7. In those cases, the risk 
sharing index drops sharply to about 30%. This result sheds light on why the benchmark 
model, featuring a power utility whereby EIS is the reciprocal of RRA, generates international 
risk sharing as low as 30%. However, when EIS takes these values, our model’s results cannot 
be reconciled with asset market data-model yields low volatility of the logarithms of IMRS, 
even lower than Hansen-Jagannathan lower bound.      
The implication is that the low proportion of foreign assets in a domestic agent’s portfolio, 
a phenomenon observed in the data, might not be a puzzle or a departure from the agent's 
optimality condition. After all, risk has already been well shared internationally due to the high 
correlations across countries of the long run productivity shocks. Hence, there is not much 
incentive left for an agent to hold foreign assets in her portfolio to further share the risk 
internationally. Therefore, equity home bias might not be a puzzle as claimed by the 
benchmark model, in the sense that it can be adequately reconciled with our theoretical 
results.
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 1. Introduction 
This is a theoretical paper regarding international risk sharing and its 
implications for the equity home bias puzzle. Our model is a general 
equilibrium model featuring two closed economies with nontrivial production 
sectors. As a result of our closed economy setup, asset holding is autarkic in 
each country. Our model also adopts the Epstein-Zin-Weil recursive utility 
function instead of the power utility commonly used in the benchmark model. 
Furthermore, the productivity process contains a small but persistent long 
run risk and a large short run risk. The international correlation of long run 
risk is high -while that of the short run risk is low in order to match the 
correlation across countries of the overall productivity in the data.  
The small but persistent long run risk becomes the major determinant of 
the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (IMRS) in a model featuring 
the Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences. Even though the model deals with closed 
economies and autarkic asset holding—a scenario leading to the lowest level 
of international risk sharing under the same condition—our model is still able 
to generate international risk sharing indexes always over 96% for a broad 
range of parameter values, excepting two cases: where the elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution (EIS) is the reciprocal of the relative risk aversion 
(RRA); and where EIS is around 0.7. In those cases, the risk sharing index 
drops sharply to about 30%. This result explains why the benchmark model, 
with a power utility whereby EIS is the reciprocal of RRA, generates an 
international risk sharing index as low as 30%. Our paper shows that the 
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international risk sharing generated from the benchmark model is not a 
general result. Rather, it is a special one arising from the use of 
EIS=1/RRA. Generally, in cases other than that, the model generates a much 
higher degree of international risk sharing.   
The implication of our results for the equity home bias puzzle is that the 
low proportion of foreign assets held in a domestic agent’s portfolio, a 
phenomenon observed in the data, might not be a puzzle or a departure from 
the agent’s optimality condition. After all, risk has already been well shared 
internationally due to the high correlations across countries of the long run 
productivity shocks. Hence, there is not much incentive left for the agent to 
hold foreign assets in order to further share her risk with foreigners. 
Therefore, the phenomenon of equity home bias might not be a puzzle as 
claimed by the benchmark model, in the sense that it can be well reconciled 
with our theoretical results. 
The model featuring the aforementioned recursive preferences and an 
exogenous stochastic process with long run risk has the potential to solve 
other puzzles arising from applying the benchmark model in international 
economics and financial economics. For instance, the benchmark model 
generates uncovered interest parity (UIP), while data exhibit the forward 
premium puzzle [see Fama (1984); Backus, Foresi and Telmer (2001)]. The 
Backus-Smith Puzzle is another example; the volatility of the exchange rate 
produced in the benchmark model is much lower than that of the data [see 
Backus, Smith (1993)]. Third, Real Business Cycle (RBC) models have 
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difficulty in explaining asset prices, a phenomenon that has been dubbed the 
equity premium puzzle. Using reasonable parameter values, the benchmark 
model generates an equity premium that is much smaller and less volatile 
than that found in the actual data from the asset market [see Mehra, 
Prescott (1988)]. Despite its success in simulating quantity variables such as 
output, consumption, and investment, the general equilibrium RBC model is 
notorious for its unsatisfactory record in explaining asset prices such as 
equity return and exchange rates.  
Since the correlations of consumption growth across countries are low, 
the benchmark models generate low levels of international risk sharing after 
applying quantity data. However, the complete asset market calls for perfect 
international risk sharing, which is achieved when agents across countries 
are holding global portfolios that are identical in composition.   
We know that models will derive an intertemporal Euler equation after 
solving the consumer’s intertemporal choice problem. In a complete market, 
this first-order condition implies that IMRS, also known as the stochastic 
discount factor (SDF), should be equalized either across agents in a closed 
economy or across countries in an open economy. In the benchmark model, 
the equality of IMRS translates into having the same consumption growth 
rates across countries, which in turn requires that agents across countries 
are holding global portfolios that are identical in composition. In reality, 
people hold the majority of their respective portfolios in domestic assets and 
only a small portion in foreign assets. The problem in reconciling the above 
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theoretical results with the real-world data has been dubbed the equity home 
bias puzzle.  
Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara (2006) generated a much higher 
degree of international risk sharing by using asset price data instead of 
quantity data (such as consumption data). They maintained that as long as 
market prices reflect the agent’s IMRS, their result of high international risk 
sharing holds true. Our paper is an attempt to reconcile the results of 
international risk sharing from both price data and quantity data; that is, we 
aim to generate high international risk sharing after applying quantity data.   
A close look at the benchmark model reveals two features. One is the 
power utility, which keeps EIS equal to the reciprocal of RRA. Moreover, the 
benchmark model assumes that the exogenous stochastic process—be it 
consumption growth in an endowment economy or productivity growth in a 
production economy—is exposed only to i.i.d. shocks.   
The limitation of benchmark model featuring those two properties points 
to a potential unified way of solving the aforementioned puzzles. The two 
aforementioned features might be the culprits that cause the benchmark 
model to generate anomalistic results. Hence, the literature modifies the 
benchmark model along two lines: first, replacing the power utility with the 
Epstein-Zin-Weil recursive preferences; and, second, by assuming an 
exogenous stochastic process containing long run risk instead of being 
exposed only to i.i.d. shocks. So far, the modified model has had some 
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success in solving the equity premium puzzle [see Bansal, Yaron (2004)], the 
forward premium puzzle [see Bansal, Shaliastovich (2006) Backus, Foresi 
and Telmer (2001)], and the Backus-Smith puzzle [see Brandt, Cochrane and 
Santa-Clara (2006); Colacito, Croce (2005)].  
Are those two modifications justified and appropriate, or are they 
arbitrary changes that have been made only to fit into a theoretical exercise? 
First, we know that preference is unobservable. There is no clear reason for 
favouring a power utility against other reasonable utility forms. Second, 
Bansal and Yaron (2004) showed that when using consumption data only, 
and without relying on price data, it is hard to differentiate between the two 
hypotheses—first, that consumption is a random walk process, or, second, 
that it contains long run growth risk. To put it another way, the consumption 
data does not reject long run risk hypothesis in favour of a random walk 
hypothesis.  
Based on the above justification, in this paper, we will adopt those two 
modifications to the benchmark model, with the goal being to shed light on 
international risk sharing and examine the implications for the equity home 
bias puzzle.  
What is the intuition behind the claim that the modified model might have 
the potential to yield high international risk sharing after applying quantity 
data? Similar to the benchmark model, the modified one derives an 
intertemporal Euler equation as consumer’s first-order condition, which 
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implies, in a complete market, an identical IMRS across countries. However, 
in the modified model the quantity implication of the first-order condition is 
quite different from that of the benchmark model. Thanks to the recursive 
preferences, equal IMRS across countries does not necessarily translate into 
the same consumption growth rates. Therefore, the modified model does not 
imply that agents across countries are holding global portfolios of identical 
composition—the root of the home bias puzzle.  
In a model with the recursive preferences, IMRS depends on both the 
consumption growth rate and the return on a hypothetical asset that pays a 
country’s aggregate consumption as its dividend. After calibrating 
parameters with reasonable values, IMRS in the model can be mainly 
determined by its second item, the return on total wealth.  
Given that the productivity growth process contains long run risk—even 
though it is small compared with transitory risk—when long run risk is very 
persistent, the return on wealth is quite sensitive to it. We know that asset 
prices reflect not only present conditions but also the expectation of future 
conditions. An innovation in long run risk changes both conditions. Therefore, 
asset prices could be quite sensitive to long run risk. As a result, a model 
with small but persistent long run risk could generate a high and volatile 
equity premium. In this sense, long run risk literature is credited with having 
the potential to solve the equity premium puzzle.   
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After extending the long run risk literature from closed to open economies, 
and further assuming that long run risk has a common global origin, the 
model has the ability to yield high correlation between IMRS across countries. 
A highly correlated IMRS across countries in turn could deliver a high level of 
international risk sharing1.   
To restore the RBC model’s good record in simulating quantity variables, 
we can adjust the magnitude of transitory risk to make sure the model’s 
quantity implications, such as the properties of production and consumption, 
are also in line with the data. The international business cycle data show that 
quantity variables have low volatilities and poor correlations across countries, 
which means the transitory risk in the model needs to be large and less 
correlated across countries to match the data.   
In summary, in a model featuring recursive preferences and a stochastic 
productivity process with long run risk, if such risk comes from a common 
global origin, then IMRS can be highly correlated across countries, which 
could yield high level of international risk sharing. Thus, our model serves as 
medium of reconciliation between the results of international risk sharing 
from quantity data and from price data. Furthermore, home bias is no longer 
a phenomenon that cannot be reconciled with a general equilibrium model. 
                                                 
1  The degree of international risk sharing is, however, not the same concept as IMRS 
correlation. See more detail and an index of international risk sharing in Brandt, Cochrane, 
and Santa-Clara (2006).  
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An agent can keep most of her portfolio in domestic assets and only a small 
portion in foreign assets, which is a scenario in line with the data, and the 
model can still achieve high degree of international risk sharing. It thus 
appears that portfolio decisions are irrelevant to the first-order condition.   
Section two will review the related literature and its relevance to the 
problem at hand, while section three will present the specifics of our model 
and its log-linear approximating solution. Section four then serves to display 
our model’s results after parameter calibration. Finally, section five will 
conclude our discussion.  
2. Review of the Literature 
This paper contributes to the literature on both international risk sharing and 
on long run risk. Our model is an extension of long run risk model from the 
endowment economy to the production economy. Using a general equilibrium 
production model along with long run risk, our paper aims to shed light on 
international risk sharing. The most related previous work in this area is that 
of Bansal and Yaron (2004); Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara (2006); 
Colacito and Croce (2005); and Croce (2006).  
Bansal and Yaron (2004) was the pioneering paper in the growing 
literature on the asset pricing field that goes under the name of “risks for the 
long run”. Their model was based on an endowment economy featuring 
recursive preferences and stochastic consumption growth process with long 
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run risk. The model has exhibited some success in solving the equity 
premium puzzle.    
Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara (2006) was the first paper to point out 
that international risk sharing is actually high after applying price data 
instead of applying quantity data, with the latter being a standard practice in 
the literature. However, since their paper lacks a theoretical model, it 
provides no formal explanation as to why the two approaches cannot be 
reconciled, nor does it explore how one might reconcile them in a single 
model. They concluded that a “surprisingly high level of risk sharing” holds 
true as long as two conditions are met. The first condition requires that asset 
prices reflect IMRS, and the second calls for either a complete asset market 
or an incomplete one with a reasonably sized uninsurable risk. Alternatively, 
if risks really are poorly shared, Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara (2006) 
maintained that exchange rates in the data are much too smooth as 
compared to the prediction of the model. 
Colacito and Croce (2005) attempted to provide Brandt, Cochrane, and 
Santa-Clara (2006) with a rigorous theoretical foundation. Colacito and Croce 
felt that the pioneering work regarding long run risk in Bansal and Yaron 
(2004) might have the potential to fully achieve their goal of generating high 
international risk sharing from quantity data. Trying to fill a gap left by 
Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara (2006), Colacito and Croce (2005) set out 
to reconcile the results of international risk sharing from quantity data with 
the results from asset price data. After extending Bansal and Yaron’s (2004) 
 12
closed economy endowment model to a two-country endowment model, 
Colacito and Croce (2005) showed that as long as long run risks are highly 
corrected across two countries, the model succeeds in generating high 
international risk sharing from quantity data.  
Croce (2006) further contributed to the long run risk literature by 
extending it from an endowment economy to a general equilibrium with 
nontrivial production sector. However, he focused on the issue of welfare cost, 
rather than that of international risk sharing. 
Following Croce (2006), our model also features the general equilibrium 
production economy with long run risk. Our focus, however, is on studying 
the issue of international risk sharing. Similar to Colacito and Croce (2005), 
we attempt to provide a rigorous theoretical foundation to Brandt, Cochrane, 
and Santa-Clara (2006). Nevertheless, our model is a general equilibrium 
production model containing long run risk, whereas Colacito and Croce 
(2005)’s model was based on the endowment economies with long run risk.  
3. Model 
We construct a general equilibrium model with nontrivial production sectors. 
There are two countries in the model, denoted respectively as home country 
(h) and foreign country (f). We study the degree of international risk sharing 
generated by the model when each country runs a closed economy and 
 13
agents’ asset holdings are autarkic—a scenario leading to the lowest level of 
international risk sharing under the same condition.   
We further assume, in each country, homogeneity among consumers and 
constant returns to scale in production. As a result, the model can be set up 
with a representative consumer and a representative firm in each country. To 
keep the model simple and focus on our central issue, we assume that the 
representative agent in each country lives infinitely and her labour supply is 
fixed. Moreover, we assume that there is a single good in the world economy. 
The good is produced in each country by its firm in a competitive 
environment. Since each country runs closed economy without exchanging 
good with another, the agent in each country derives utility solely from 
consuming the good produced in her country.  
3.1. Preferences 
Although the use of the power utility is standard practice in benchmark 
models, we abandon the use of the power utility as preference. Instead, we 
adopt the recursive preferences named after Epstein and Zin (1989, 1991) 
and Weil (1989). The main feature of those Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences is 
their disentangling of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS), 
denoted ψ , from the coefficient of the relative risk aversion (RRA), denoted 
γ . However, with a power utility, EIS always equals the reciprocal of RRA; 
that is, 1γψ = . Yet, it is not clear that these two concepts should be linked 
so tightly. As Campbell (2003) stated: “[R] isk aversion describes the 
 14
consumer's reluctance to substitute consumption across states of the world 
and is meaningful even in an atemporal setting, whereas the elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution describes the consumer's willingness to substitute 
consumption over time and is meaningful even in a deterministic setting” 
(page 828).  
The representative agents maximize the objective function, which takes 
the Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences as its utility form: 
 ( ) ( )1 1 1111i i it t t tU C EU− −−+⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪= − +⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
θ
γ γ
γθ θβ β  (1) 
 { },i h f∀ ∈  
where ( )1 / 1⎛ ⎞= − −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ 
1θ γ
ψ
 implicitly defines EIS (ψ ). When 1/=γ ψ , we have 
that 1= θ  and Equation (1) reduces to a power utility. itU  denotes the utility 
of the agent of the ith  country at time t , itC  is her consumption at time t , 
and  β denotes the subjective discount factor, also known as the time-
preference factor. 
Using dynamic programming, Epstein and Zin (1989) showed that after 
solving the consumer’s optimal consumption problem, the optimality 
condition—the intertemporal Euler equation—takes the form 
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( )( )11 , 1 , 1 1,i itt c t j ti
t
CE R R
C
− −+ + +
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥ =⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
θ
ψ θθβ                   (2) 
where , 1
i
c tR +  is the gross return on a hypothetical asset between time t  and 
1t +  which pays the ith  country’s aggregate consumption as its dividends in 
each period. , 1j tR +  is the gross return on the jth  asset between time t  and 
1t + .  
Equation (2) contains an important concept in asset pricing literature—
IMRS, also known as SDF or the pricing kernel. We display it separately 
below:  
( )( )11 , 1ii itt c ti
t
CM R
C
− −+ +
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
θ
ψ θθβ                   (3) 
In a benchmark model featuring the power utility, the pricing kernel M  
takes the form 
1
i
i t
t i
t
CM
C
−
+⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
γ
β            (4) 
In a complete market, the pricing kernel M  is unique across countries, 
which implies that the following equation holds in a benchmark model: 
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1 1
fh
h ft t
t th f
t t
CCM M
C C
−−
+ +⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞= = =⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
γγ
β β   (5) 
Equation (5) implicitly assumes that agents in home and foreign country 
have an identical RRA (γ ) and an identical time preference factor (β ). In the 
benchmark model, a unique pricing kernel requires that home and foreign 
country achieve equal consumption growth rates, which in turn necessitates 
that agents across countries are holding global portfolios that are identical in 
composition. This result from the benchmark theoretical model is in dramatic 
contrast to the actual data. The data shows that investors hold a majority of 
their portfolios in domestic assets and only a small portion in foreign assets; 
thus, in practice, the compositions of the global equity portfolios held by 
domestic and foreign investors are far from identical. As a result, the equity 
home bias puzzle arises. 
Equation (3) is the pricing kernel M  from the Epstein-Zin-Weil 
preferences. In a complete market, the presence of a unique pricing kernel 
implies that the following equation (6) holds true. Again, we assume that 
agents across countries share the same parameters, γ , β , and ψ .  
( )( ) ( )( )111 1, 1 , 1fh fh h ft tt c t tc th f
t t
CCM R R M
C C
−− −−+ ++ +
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞= = =⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
θθ
ψψ θθθ θβ β  (6) 
Equation (6) shows that with the recursive preferences, a unique pricing 
kernel does not necessarily imply equal consumption growth rates across 
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countries, and, in turn, does not necessarily translate to identically composed 
global equity portfolios held by agents in the two countries. As a result, it 
appears that equity home bias might not necessarily be a phenomenon that 
stands against the first-order condition derived from theoretical models.  
3.2. Production 
In this section, we work on the stochastic productivity growth process to 
introduce another line of modification to the benchmark models. In the 
benchmark models, the law of motion of productivity growth is often 
assumed being a stochastic process exposed to i.i.d. shocks alone. In this 
paper, the productivity growth process is exposed to i.i.d. shocks as well as 
long run shocks. We specify the law of motion of productivity growth 
containing long run risk as follows: 
{ }
1 1
1 ,
, ,
i i i
t t t
i i i
t t x t
z x w
x x
i h f
+ +
−
∆ = µ + +
= +
∀ ∈
ρ ε         (7) 
where 1 1log
i i
t tz Z+ +=  and 1itZ +  denote the ith  country’s total factor productivity 
at time t , and µ  is the logarithm of the steady state productivity level. 1tw + , 
which denotes the short-run component of productivity growth risk, is an i.i.d. 
random variable. tx  is the long-run component of productivity growth risk, 
with ρ measuring its persistence and ,x t ε  its contemporaneous i.i.d. shock.  
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We specify the variance-covariance matrix of productivity growth shocks 
as follows: 
( )1 , 11 , 1, , , , 0;
0
0
1
1
1
,
1
f fh h
t x tt x t
w
x
w
x
w w Nε ε+ ++ +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∼
2
w
2
x
hf
w
hf
w
hf
x
hf
x
Σ
σ Γ
Σ
σ Γ
ρ
Γ
ρ
ρ
Γ
ρ
                  (8) 
where 2xσ  denotes the variance of the long run productivity growth shocks in 
each country while 2wσ  denotes the short-run variance. 
hf
xρ  is the correlation 
of the long run shocks across countries, whereas hfwρ  is the corresponding 
correlation of the short run risks. We assume the cross correlations between 
short run and long run risks, either within a country or across countries, are 
both zero.  
A high hfxρ  and a high ρ are two critical factors that allow our model to 
generate high degree of international risk sharing. The reason for this is that, 
in a model incorporating the Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences, if long run risk is 
very persistent, it becomes the major determinant of IMRS. Furthermore, if 
long run risk is highly correlated across countries, IMRS will also be highly 
correlated across countries. The high correlation between IMRS across 
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countries could further translate to a claim that international risk sharing is 
high.  
The rest of our model is set up as follows. In a general equilibrium 
production model, the firm in each country maximizes its present value to 
owners, 2  subject to the capital stock law of motion and the stochastic 
productivity growth process. The firm pays its worker the competitive wage 
rate, which is equal to the marginal product of labour. The firm then pays its 
shareholder dividends. We assume a Cobb-Douglas production function 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 ,i i i i i it t t t t tY Z N K Z K−α α −α α= =         (9) 
where itY  denotes the ith  country’s output at time t , and 
i
tN  denotes its 
firm’s labor demand for period t . At equilibrium, the firm’s labour demand 
equals the worker’s labour supply, which we normalized to unity. itK  is the 
capital stock owned by the firm of the ith  country at the beginning of period 
t , α  denotes capital’s share, and 1−α  denotes labour’s share. Capital stock is 
chosen one period before it becomes productive, and labour can be adjusted 
instantaneously.  
Adding production to a model makes its asset price implications even 
worse, since the agent can now smooth her consumption even better with 
                                                 
2 The firm’s present value to owners is the sum total of all its current and future expected 
dividends discounted by a market SDF deemed valid for every owner.  
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production technology than in an endowment economy. To deal with this 
problem, a standard practice in the production-based asset pricing literature 
is to impose the adjustment cost in firm’s investment. Following the literature, 
we adopt the adjustment cost in our model. Hence, the firm’s capital stock 
evolves according to the following law of motion: 
( )1 1 ,
i
i i it
t t ti
t
IK K K
K
δ+
⎛ ⎞= Ψ + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
            (10) 
where 1
i
tK +  denotes the capital stock of the firm of the ith  country at the 
beginning of period 1t + , itI  is the investment made by the firm during period 
t , δ  denotes the depreciation rate, and Ψ  is a function form of adjustment 
cost, which is increasing and concave in investment I  ( )′ ′′Ψ > 0, Ψ > 0, Ψ < 0 . 
This setting reflects the idea that changing the capital stock rapidly is more 
costly than changing it slowly.  
The firm maximizes its value to shareholder subject to the production 
function (9), the law of motion of the capital stock (10), and the stochastic 
process of productivity growth with long run risk (7). The first-order 
conditions for maximizing the firm’s value are: 
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1
1
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s
s
s
s s s
s
s s s
s s s
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K
W Z K
I
K I IR Z K
K KI
K
α α
α α
α
δ
α
−
+
+− − ++ + +
++
+
= ⎛ ⎞′Ψ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
= −
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞− + Ψ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎛ ⎞⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥ ′= + − Ψ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎛ ⎞ ⎝ ⎠′Ψ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
          (11)   
3.3. Log-linear Approximating Solution 
After log-linearizing the system around its steady state, which contains a 
constant growth rate g , we get the following approximating solution, 
including a solution to consumption growth and IMRS (See Appendix 1 for 
details):  
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α α
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⎡ ⎤2 + − δ 1++ + −⎢ ⎥+ δ + δ⎣ ⎦
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤1− δ 2 + − δ 1++ + + + −⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥+ δ + δ + δ⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
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α
α
α α
+ +
⎡ ⎤1+ 1++ − α −⎢ ⎥+ δ + δ⎣ ⎦
⎧ ⎫1− δ + 1− ρ +⎡ ⎤1+⎪ ⎪+ − α + + −⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥+ δ + δ⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
⎡ ⎤2 + − δ 1++ + −⎢ ⎥+ δ + δ⎣ ⎦
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤1− δ 2 + − δ 1++ + + + −⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥+ δ + δ + δ⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
ε
 (12) 
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Here , xm εη  is the exposure of IMRS to innovation in the long run 
productivity shock, , 1x t+ ε , and ,m wη  is the exposure of IMRS to innovation in 
the short run shock, 1tw + .  
3.4. Index of International Risk sharing 
Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara (2006) constructed the following index to 
gauge the degree of international risk sharing: 
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where IIRS denotes the index of international risk sharing, m  is the 
logarithm of IMRS, and 2σ  denotes unconditional variances. The use of 
unconditional variances is justified by two considerations. First, since we are 
using a discrete-time model, starting with ( )1 1 1t t tE m R+ + = , we can condition 
down to ( ) 1E mR = ;3 second, after calibration, the results of our model can be 
compared with the unconditional moments obtained from the data.  
Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara (2006) emphasized the difference 
between the index and the correlation between m  across countries. They 
argued that “[r] isk sharing requires that domestic and foreign marginal 
utility growth are equal, not just perfectly correlated, and our index detects 
violations of scale as well as of correlation” (page 672). They also provided 
an example to show the difference: “[F]or example, if ln 2 lnf dm m= × , risks 
are not perfectly shared despite perfect correlation. In this case, our index is 
0.8” (page 672).  
4. The Model’s Results After Parameterization 
4.1. Parameterization 
                                                 
3 See Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara (2006) footnote 5 for more detail.  
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In the literature on calibration, parameter values are chosen “[F] or purposes 
of ‘calibration’ in a quarterly model” (Campbell (1994) p467). Following this 
practice, we choose the parameter values as follows. g , the logarithm of 
growth rate at steady state, is chosen to be 0.005 (2% at an annual rate). r , 
logarithm of steady state return on risky asset, is set at 0.015 (6% at an 
annual rate). β , subjective discount factor, is set at 0.99923 (0.997 at an 
annual rate); depreciate rate δ  is set at 0.025 (10% at an annual rate);4 
capital’s share, denoted as α , is set to be 0.36, a standard value in literature. 
ζ , a parameter related to investment adjustment cost, with 1ζ  being the 
elasticity of investment-capital ratio with respect to marginal q, is set at 
0.8306.5 ρ , the persistence of long run productivity risk, is set at 0.987.6 1n , 
the parameter of linearization of the return to consumption equity defined by 
1
Pn
P C
= + , is set at 0.9965, an average number between 0.996 from 
Campbell (2003) and 0.997 from Bansal and Yaron (2004). 
K
C
, steady state 
level of capital-consumption ratio, is chosen to be 12.5544, an average level 
between 11.3755 in Campbell (1994) and 13.7333 in Uhlig (1999); 
                                                 
4 These four parameter values are in line with Kydland and Prescott (1982).  
5  Eberly (1997) estimated the elasticity for the U.S., denoted 1ζ , at a 95% confidence 
interval of [1.08, 1.36].  
6 Croce (2006) set this number at 0.98.  
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Analogously, 
Y
C
, steady state level of output-consumption ratio, is set at 
1.3387, an average between 1.3423 and 1.3350, from Campbell (1994) and 
Uhlig (1999) respectively. To cover the whole range of possibility, we set EIS, 
{ }ψ ∈ 20,10,5, 2,1.7,1.5,1.1,1,0.9,0.71,0.5,0.2,0.1,1/15 and RRA, { }γ ∈ 15,10,5 . This 
range covers the cases of both 
1ψ ≠ γ  and 
1ψ = γ . This range also includes 
ψ =1. Table 1 summarizes the key parameter values chosen for our model.  
Table 1 
Parameter Values 
 Parameter Quarterly Value Equivalent 
Annual 
Rate 
1 Steady state growth rate g 0.005 2% 
2 Steady state return on risky asset r 0.015 6% 
3 Subjective discount factor β  0.99923 0.997 
4 Depreciation δ  0.025 10% 
5 Capital’s share α  0.36  
6 Parameter related to Adjustment cost  0.8306  
7 Persistence of long run productivity shock 0.987  
8  n1 0.9965  
9 Steady state capital-consumption ratio 12.5544  
10 Steady state output-consumption ratio 1.3387  
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11 EIS 20,10,5,2,⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪1.7,1.5,1.1,1,⎪ ⎪⎨ ⎬0.9,0.71,0.5,⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪0.2,0.1,1/15⎩ ⎭
 
 
12 RRA { }15,10,5   
 
We calibrate the variance-covariance matrix of productivity growth shocks 
to match the data. Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001) parameterized the 
quarterly volatility of the log productivity growth, z∆σ , to be 0.018. Since 
Equation (7) shows that a productivity process is constituted by an AR (1) 
long run risk and an i.i.d. short run risk, the overall productivity’s 
unconditional variance is: 
2 2 2 2 2
2
1 0.018
1z x w w
2∆ εσ = σ + σ = σ + σ =− ρ     (15) 
Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1995) summarized productivity’s 
international correlations based on international business cycles data. For 
example, ( , ) 0.56eu uscorr z z =  and ( , ) 0.58japan uscorr z z = . We take the average 
of the two, 0.57, as our parameter value for the international correlation of 
the log productivity growth. Then, we get the following equation: 
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where 
2
wn 2ε
σ= σ , the ratio between the variance of the short run shock to the 
variance of the long run shock. Recalling that our model assumes a small but 
persistent long run shock, along with a large short run shock, n  needs to be 
a large number. We set 64n = . Equations (15) and (16) imply that 
1.42%wσ =  and , ( , ) 0.31h fcorr w w = . Consequently, the variance of the long 
run shock, 2εσ , explains about 0.97% of the variance of the productivity 
growth. We assume that the small but persistent long run productivity 
growth shocks have a common global origin, and that, as a result, the 
correlation across the two countries of long run productivity growth shocks is 
set to be 1, i.e., ( , ) 1h fcorr ε ε = . Table 2 displays a summary of our choices of 
parameters for the productivity process. 
Table 2 
Parameter Values for the Productivity Process 
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 Parameter Quarterly Value 
1 Unconditional standard deviation of productivity 
growth 
0.018 
2 
International correlation of productivity growth 0.57 
3 
N, the ratio between the variance of the short run 
shock to the variance of the long run shock 
64 
4 International correlation of long run productivity 
growth shocks 
1 
 Parameter Value Generated in 
the Model 
5 Standard deviation of short run productivity growth 
shocks 
1.42% 
6 International correlation of short run productivity 
growth shocks 
0.31 
 
4.2. Results 
Table 3 reports our model’s results for , xm εη and ,m wη  after parameterization, 
where , xm εη captures IMRS’s exposure to innovation in the long-run 
component, , 1x t+ ε , and ,m wη  is IMRS’s exposure to innovation in the short-
run component, 1tw + . Put it another way, , xm εη is the innovation in 1tm +  driven 
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by the innovation in , 1x t+ ε , and ,m wη  is the innovation in 1tm +  driven by the 
innovation in 1tw + .  
Table 3 
Model results for , xm εη  and ,m wη   
EIS RRA , xm εη  ,m wη  
20 15 -612.07 -12.85 
20 10 -407.37 -8.57 
20 5 -202.66 -4.28 
10 15 -550.07 -12.85 
10 10 -365.49 -8.57 
10 5 -180.90 -4.28 
5 15 -466.87 -12.85 
5 10 -309.15 -8.57 
5 5 -151.43 -4.28 
2 15 -306.84 -12.85 
2 10 -201.06 -8.57 
2 5 -95.28 -4.28 
1.7 15 -269.74 -12.85 
1.7 10 -176.19 -8.57 
1.7 5 -82.64 -4.28 
1.5 15 -238.79 -12.85 
1.5 10 -155.54 -8.57 
1.5 5 -72.28 -4.28 
1.1 15 -151.77 -12.85 
1.1 10 -97.99 -8.57 
1.1 5 -44.22 -4.28 
1 15 -121.66 -12.85 
1 10 -78.30 -8.57 
1 5 -34.95 -4.28 
0.9 15 -86.30 -12.85 
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0.9 10 -55.35 -8.57 
0.9 5 -24.40 -4.28 
0.71 15 1.97 -12.85 
0.71 10 1.05 -8.57 
0.71 5 0.14 -4.28 
0.5 15 157.27 -12.85 
0.5 10 96.40 -8.57 
0.5 5 35.53 -4.28 
0.2 15 681.82 -12.85 
0.2 10 338.05 -8.57 
0.203 5 -0.59 -4.28 
0.1 15 778.05 -12.85 
0.10113 10 -3.88 -8.57 
0.1 5 -822.08 -4.28 
0.0675 15 -1.78 -12.85 
1/15 10 -1301.78 -8.57 
1/15 5 -2554.82 -4.28 
 
Table 3 shows that , xm εη  is much larger than ,m wη . According to our 
results, on average, , xm εη  is more than 33 times greater than ,m wη . This is 
pivotal for our model to be able to generate high international risk sharing. 
In a model featuring recursive preferences and a stochastic productivity 
process with long run risk, if , xm εη  is much larger than ,m wη , a small but 
persistent long run risk dominates a large short run risk to become a major 
determinant of IMRS 1tm + . Furthermore, if long run risk is highly correlated 
across countries, so is IMRS. As a result, the model generates a high degree 
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of international risk sharing, even though the two countries run closed 
economies and agents’ asset holding are autarkic.   
Finally, Table 4 presents our model’s results for IIRS, index of 
international risk sharing.  
Table 4 
Model results for Index of International Risk sharing (IIRS) 
EIS RRA IIRS 
20 15 99.9497% 
20 10 99.9496% 
20 5 99.9491% 
10 15 99.9378% 
10 10 99.9374% 
10 5 99.9361% 
5 15 99.9137% 
5 10 99.9125% 
5 5 99.9088% 
2 15 99.8005% 
2 10 99.7935% 
2 5 99.7701% 
1.7 15 99.7420% 
1.7 10 99.7313% 
1.7 5 99.6948% 
1.5 15 99.6711% 
1.5 10 99.6556% 
1.5 5 99.6016% 
1.1 15 99.1915% 
1.1 10 99.1388% 
1.1 5 98.9457% 
1 15 98.7499% 
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1 10 98.6607% 
1 5 98.3277% 
0.9 15 97.5597% 
0.9 10 97.3709% 
0.9 5 96.6545% 
0.71 15 31.9534% 
0.71 10 31.6154% 
0.71 5 31.0348% 
0.5 15 99.2465% 
0.5 10 99.1104% 
0.5 5 98.3801% 
0.2 15 99.9595% 
0.2 10 99.9268% 
0.203 5 31.7722% 
0.1 15 99.9689% 
0.10113 10 38.6128% 
0.1 5 99.9969% 
0.0675 15 31.7849% 
1/15 10 99.9951% 
1/15 5 99.9997% 
 
Our model produces international risk sharing levels above 96% for most 
parameter values of EIS and RRA. Only when EIS is around either 1/RRA or 
0.7 does IIRS drop sharply, falling to levels as low as approximately 30%.  
Using exchange rate and equity data, Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara 
(2006) reported international risk sharing levels above 98%: 0.986 (US vs. 
UK); 0.985 (US vs. Germany); 0.980 (US vs. Japan).  
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Adopting an endowment economy model with long run consumption risk, 
Colacito and Croce (2005) produced an international correlation of discount 
factor growth as high as 92%.     
4.3. The Intuition Behind ,m wη  (IMRS’s Exposure to Short-run Shock) 
Recall IMRS from Equation (3): 
( )( )11 , 1ii itt c ti
t
CM R
C
− −+ +
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
θ
ψ θθβ  
To examine the contemporaneous effect of 1tw +  on the system while 
eliminating the intertemporal channel, we may equivalently consider a case 
in which ψ = 0 , which means that a change in interest rates has no impact on 
future consumption, that is, there is no intertemporal effect. If ψ = 0 , then it 
follows that 0θ → , 1θ −1 → − , and 1 0θ− → − γ <ψ . A positive 1tw +  causes both 
1tc +  and , 1c tR +  to rise, and, as a result, 1tm +  falls; it then follows that ,m wη  is 
negative. The larger γ  is, the more 1tm +  decreases, and the more negative 
,m wη  becomes. Therefore, we can say that ,m wη  is decreasing in γ . Chart 1 
depicts the relationship between ,m wη  and parameters EIS and RRA.  
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Chart 1  Relationship between the Exposure of m to Short-run Risk 
and Parameters EIS and RRA
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4.4. The Intuition behind , xm εη  (IMRS’s Exposure to Long-run Shock) 
Table 2 reveals that for 
1ψ > γ  (or 
1 < γψ ), , xm εη  is negative for large ψ  and 
positive for small ψ ; for 1ψ ≤ γ , a case implying a very small ψ , 
, xm εη becomes negative again. Chart 2 depicts this result.   
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Chart 2  Relationship between the Exposure of m to Long-run Risk 
and Parameters EIS and RRA
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The result is intuitive. In most situations, a positive long-run productivity 
shock , 1x t+ε  drives the return on consumption equity , 1c tR +  upwards. In regard 
to long-run shock’s impact on consumption, on one hand, a positive , 1x t+ ε  
raises consumption, because of the income effect; on the other hand, a 
positive , 1x t+ ε  increases the agent’s desire to borrow, since future output will 
be higher due to the persistence of the positive productivity shock. This 
causes interest rates to rise, thus creating a negative substitution effect on 
consumption that becomes stronger as the parameter ψ  becomes greater. 
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When ψ  takes a large value, the substitution effect could be greater than the 
income effect, and consumption could then fall. For the values of ψ  under 
consideration in this paper, the income effect always dominates over the 
substitution effect, and consumption rises after a positive long-run 
productivity growth shock , 1x t+ ε .   
Recalling Equation (3), with recursive preferences, IMRS depends on both 
, 1c tR +  and 1tc + : 
( )( )
( )
11
, 1
, , ,x x c x
i
i it
t c ti
t
m c R
CM R
C
− −+ +
ε ε ε
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
θη = − η + θ −1 ηψ
θ
ψ θθβ
 
Considering the case in which 
1ψ > γ , if ψ  is larger than one (ψ >1), we 
find that θ < 0 ; if ψ  is smaller than one ( ψ <1 ), then θ >1. In the case of 
ψ >1, a positive , 1x t+ ε  causes , 1c tR +  to rise and 1tc +  to either fall or rise. θ < 0  
implies that θ −1 < 0  and 0θ− >ψ . Therefore, a rise in , 1c tR +  leads to a fall in 
1tm + , and a fall or rise in 1tc +  results in a respective fall or rise in 1tm + . Since 
the impact of , 1x t+ ε  on , 1c tR + , denoted ,c xR εη , always dominates7  over its 
                                                 
7 When 1ψ = , it is a weak domination.  
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impact on 1tc + , denoted , xc εη , the overall result is that a positive , 1x t+ ε  
causes 1tm +  to fall, which implies a negative , xm εη .  
If ψ <1  but is still larger than 1γ , we have θ >1, which implies θ −1 > 0  and 
0θ− <ψ . Hence, a rise in , 1c tR +  due to a positive shock , 1x t+ ε  leads to a rise in 
1tm + , while a rise in 1tc +  causes a fall in 1tm + . The overall effect of , 1x t+ ε  on 
1tm +  is positive and, therefore, , xm εη  is positive.  
If ψ =1 , , 1x t+ ε  equally affects both , 1c tR +  and 1tc + , and we have 
, ,c x xR cε εη = η . In that case, , xm εη  becomes 
( ), , , ,
, 0
x x c x c x
c x
m c R R
R
ε ε ε ε
ε
⎛ ⎞θ θη = − η + θ −1 η = − + θ −1 η⎜ ⎟ψ ψ⎝ ⎠
= −γη <
 
In addition, our simulation shows that , 1c tr +  falls when [ )*,1ψ ∈ , where 
1 * 1< <γ . Our simulation reports * is around [0.7,0.9]. When EIS falls into 
this range, 2A , the exposure to long-run shock of the logarithm of price-
consumption ratio 8  becomes negative. This means that the price-
consumption ratio ,c tp  falls after a positive long-run shock , 1x t+ε . Recall that 
                                                 
8 , 0 1 2 3c t t t tp A A k A x A w= + + +  
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, 1 0 1 , 1 , 1c t c t c t t tr n n p p c c+ + += + − + − ; a lower price-consumption ratio thus 
contributes to a fall in , 1c tr + .   
If ψ  is very small and satisfies 1ψ < γ , we get 0 < θ <1 , which in turn 
implies θ −1 < 0  and 0θ− <ψ . As a result, a rise in , 1c tR +  causes 1tm +  to fall, 
and a rise in 1tc +  also causes 1tm +  to fall. Therefore, a positive , 1x t+ ε  causes 
1tm +  to fall, when ψ  takes very small values. In that case, , xm εη  is negative. 
Table 5 summarizes the intuition behind , xm εη .  
Table 5 
Intuition behind , xm εη  
 parameter θ  θ− ψ
 
1tc +  θ −1 , 1c tR +
 
Expos
ure of 
m to 
1tc +  
Exposure of 
m to , 1c tR +   
Innovati
on in m , xm εη
 
EIS>1 <0 >0 Fall/
rise 
<0 rise Fall/
rise 
fall fall - 
EIS=1   rise  rise   fall - 
*<EIS<1 >1 <0 rise >0 fall fall fall fall - 
EIS>1/
RRA 
1/RRA<EIS
<* 
>1 <0 rise >0 rise fall rise rise + 
EIS<=1/RRA (0,1] <0 rise <0 rise fall fall fall _ 
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4.5. Results for Consumption Properties 
Business cycle data for industrialized countries show a quarterly volatility of 
log consumption growth of approximately 1.4%9. In addition, the quarterly 
correlations across countries of the log consumption growth are: 0.43 (U.S. 
vs. U.K.); 0.39 (U.S. vs. Germany); and 0.30 (U.S. vs. Japan).10 Our model 
produces results that are in line with these data. Table 6 summarizes our 
model’s results for the volatility and international correlation of consumption 
growth rates. 
One of the striking facts shown by international business cycle data is that 
the international correlations of consumption growth are surprisingly smaller 
than the correlations of output growth or productivity growth across 
countries, whereas the standard models predict the opposite. Fortunately, 
our model has no difficulty in generating results consistent with the data. 
After setting the correlations across countries of productivity growths to be 
0.57 to match the data, our model delivers international correlations of 
consumption growth around 30%–40%, which is lower than the correlation of 
productivity growth, as the data depicts.  
 
                                                 
9 See Croce (2006) for more detail.  
10 The data is from Table 2 of Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992).   
 41
Table 6 
Our Model’s Results for Properties of Consumption Growth 
EIS RRA 
Standard deviation of consumption 
growth 
International 
correlation of 
consumption 
growth 
20 15 1.2175% 0.3101 
20 10 1.2175% 0.3101 
20 5 1.2175% 0.3101 
10 15 1.2179% 0.3106 
10 10 1.2179% 0.3106 
10 5 1.2179% 0.3106 
5 15 1.2195% 0.3123 
5 10 1.2195% 0.3123 
5 5 1.2195% 0.3123 
2 15 1.2282% 0.3220 
2 10 1.2282% 0.3220 
2 5 1.2282% 0.3220 
1.7 15 1.2317% 0.3259 
1.7 10 1.2317% 0.3259 
1.7 5 1.2317% 0.3259 
1.5 15 1.2352% 0.3297 
1.5 10 1.2352% 0.3297 
1.5 5 1.2352% 0.3297 
1.1 15 1.2480% 0.3434 
1.1 10 1.2480% 0.3434 
1.1 5 1.2480% 0.3434 
1 15 1.2535% 0.3491 
1 10 1.2535% 0.3491 
1 5 1.2535% 0.3491 
0.9 15 1.2607% 0.3565 
0.9 10 1.2607% 0.3565 
0.9 5 1.2607% 0.3565 
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0.71 15 1.2826% 0.3783 
0.71 10 1.2826% 0.3783 
0.71 5 1.2826% 0.3783 
0.5 15 1.3363% 0.4273 
0.5 10 1.3363% 0.4273 
0.5 5 1.3363% 0.4273 
0.2 15 1.7569% 0.6687 
0.2 10 1.7569% 0.6687 
0.2 5 1.7569% 0.6687 
0.1 15 2.7202% 0.8618 
0.1 10 2.7202% 0.8618 
0.1 5 2.7202% 0.8618 
1/15 15 3.7921% 0.9289 
1/15 10 3.7921% 0.9289 
1/15 5 3.7921% 0.9289 
 
Table 6 shows that changing the value of RRA has virtually no impact on 
the second moments of aggregate variables such as consumption growth. 
This result is consistent with the findings in Tallarini (2000): “[R] isk aversion 
seems to affect asset market implications and the elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution affects quantity dynamics” (page 509). He thus points to a way 
to improve the RBC model’s performance in regard to asset prices. Since the 
model’s performance with respect to quantity variables mainly depends on 
EIS, while its performance in asset prices depends on RRA, by fixing EIS but 
increasing RRA, RBC models achieve better results in simulating asset prices 
while retaining their satisfactory records in simulating quantity variables.  
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Table 6 reveals that both the volatility and international correlation of 
consumption growth are decreasing in EIS (ψ ). This result is intuitive. EIS is 
a parameter controlling the magnitude of the intertemporal effect. Equation 
(12) shows that EIS affects the exposure to long-run risk of consumption 
growth, but will not affect exposure to short-run risk. Moreover, the greater 
the value of EIS, the more an agent has incentive to smooth her 
consumption over time, which results in less volatility of consumption growth.  
Our simulation results demonstrate a decrease in the exposure to long-
run risk of consumption growth in EIS. This is again because of the incentive 
towards consumption smoothing. Given that the international correlation of 
long-run risk is assumed to be much larger than the correlation of short-run 
risk, the greater the value of EIS, the less long-run component will dominate 
the short-run in the innovation to consumption growth, and, consequently, 
the lower the international correlation of consumption growth will be.    
4.6. Properties of the Model’s IIRS Results 
Table 4 shows the following properties of our model’s IIRS results. Given 
fixed values for RRA, we find a W-shaped relation between IIRS and EIS, 
with IIRS twice reaching its local minimum at either around EIS=1/RRA or 
around EIS=0.7. On the other hand, given fixed values of EIS, the 
relationship between IIRS and RRA appears to be V-shaped, with IIRS hitting 
bottom at around EIS=1/RRA. Our results confirm that when EIS=1/RRA, 
IIRS drops sharply and international risk sharing is low, a finding consistent 
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with that of the benchmark model featuring a power utility whereby EIS 
always equals the reciprocal of RRA.   
Charts 3, 4, and 5, presented below, demonstrate the W-shaped relation 
between IIRS and EIS, with RRA fixed at 5, 10, and 15, respectively.   
Chart 3  Relationship between IIRS and EIS
(RRA=5)
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Chart 4  Relationship between IIRS and EIS
(RRA=10)
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Chart 5  Relationship between IIRS and EIS
(RRA=15)
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Colacito and Croce (2005) reported a V-shaped relation between EIS and 
the international correlation of IMRS11, with correlation reaching its lowest 
level at around EIS=1/RRA.12 However, we reported a W-shaped relation 
between EIS and IIRS, with two stationary points found around EIS=1/RRA 
and EIS=0.7.  
From the point of view of empirical research, whether the estimator of EIS 
( ψ ) is larger or smaller than unity is still an open question. Hansen and 
Singleton (1983), Attanasio and Weber (1989), Attanasio and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2003), Guvenen (2006), and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) all 
estimated EIS to be greater than unity. In contrast, others, such as Hall 
(1988), Campbell (1999), Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2005) and Favero 
(2005) estimated its value to be smaller than unity. However, Bansal and 
Yaron (2004) pointed out that estimates like those done by Hall (1988) 
depend on the assumption that economic volatility is homoskedastic. The 
presence of time-varying second moments (heteroskedasity) leads to a 
serious downward bias in estimates for EIS when using a regression 
approach such as that used in Hall (1988). This bias might help explain the 
large estimates for EIS found in the long-run literature.  
                                                 
11 International correlation of IMRS is related to IIRS. However they are not the same concept.  
12 See Fig.2 in Colacito and Croce (2005) for more detail.  
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In the benchmark model, EIS - being treated as the reciprocal of RRA - is 
smaller than 1. Most of the studies in the long-run risk literature consider 
cases where EIS is greater than unity. Bansal and Yaron (2004), for example, 
studied a case where { }ψ =1.5, γ ∈ 7.5,10 , and Colacito and Croce (2005) 
considered a case where ψ = 2, γ = 4.25 . Similarly, Croce (2006) focused on a 
case where { }0.8,1,1.5 , 16ψ ∈ γ = . 
Our results demonstrate that the magnitude of IIRS is sensitive to the 
value of EIS. When reporting the relationship between IIRS and RRA with EIS 
fixed, we considered the value of EIS as being confined to a broad range 
from 1/15 to 20, covering all cases where EIS<1, EIS=1, and EIS>1. Charts 
6, 7, 8, and 9 report the relationship between IIRS and RRA, when EIS is 
fixed at 0.7, 1, 1.5 and 2, respectively. It appears that the relationship is V-
shaped, with IIRS reaching its lowest level at around RRA=1/EIS.  
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Chart 6  Relationship between IIRS and RRA
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Chart 7  Relationship between IIRS and RRA
(EIS=1)
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Chart 8  Relationship between IIRS and RRA
(EIS=1.5)
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Chart 10  Relationship between IIRS and RRA
(EIS=2)
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4.7. The Intuition Behind the W-shaped Relation between IIRS and EIS 
The question quickly arises: Why does our model produce a W-shaped 
relation between IIRS and EIS, rather than a V-shaped relation such as that 
in Colacito and Croce (2005)? The answer is to be found in carrying out an 
analysis of , xm εη , IMRS’s exposure to long-run shock. Chart 2 shows , xm εη  
changing sign twice, once around EIS=1/RRA and again around EIS=0.7. 
Around each sign change, , xm εη  is quite small so that , ,|| | |xm m wεη < η , that is, 
IMRS’s exposure to long run shocks is smaller than that to short-run shock. 
Recall that we assumed the international correlation for short-run shock is 
much smaller than for long-run shock. Hence, the model produces two 
stationary points in the graph of the relationship between IIRS and EIS. To 
put it another ay, our model delivered low levels of international risk sharing 
when IMRS’s exposure to short-run shock dominates that to long-run shock.  
4.8. Regarding the Possibility that EIS and IIRS Match the Predictions 
of the Benchmark Model 
Is it possible that EIS is indeed around 1/RRA or around 0.7 and that IIRS is 
as low as 30%, a prediction supported by the benchmark model? To answer 
this question, we looked at the model’s results for the standard deviation of 
the logarithms of IMRS ( ( )mσ ). Even though there is no data for ( )mσ , since 
IMRS is unobservable, Hensen-Jagannathan (1991), by using asset market 
data, developed the following lower bound for ( )mσ :  
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 ( )
2
, 1 , 1 2
i
t i t f t
i
E r r
m + +
σ⎡ ⎤− +⎣ ⎦σ ≥ σ  
Recall that our model deals with closed economies and autarkic asset 
holdings. If the agent is allowed to hold foreign assets, ( )mσ  will become 
smaller due to the diversifying away of some idiosyncratic risks. This implies 
that ( )mσ  will probably decrease in data drawn from open economies and 
our results for ( )mσ  have upward bias. Using a quarterly data set, Campbell 
(2003) reported an estimate of the lower bound for ( )mσ  above 30% for 
most industrialized countries. Thus, the value of ( )mσ  produced by our 
model, in order to be reasonable, must be above 30%; those below 30% 
cannot be reconciled with asset market data.  
Table 7 
Model’s result on the volatility of the logarithms of IMRS 
EIS RRA 
Standard deviation of consumption 
growth 
20 15 6.77 
20 10 4.50 
20 5 2.24 
10 15 6.08 
10 10 4.04 
10 5 2.00 
5 15 5.16 
5 10 3.42 
5 5 1.67 
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2 15 3.40 
2 10 2.23 
2 5 1.05 
1.7 15 2.99 
1.7 10 1.95 
1.7 5 0.92 
1.5 15 2.65 
1.5 10 1.72 
1.5 5 0.80 
1.1 15 1.69 
1.1 10 1.09 
1.1 5 0.49 
1 15 1.36 
1 10 0.87 
1 5 0.39 
0.9 15 0.97 
0.9 10 0.62 
0.9 5 0.28 
0.71 15 0.18 
0.71 10 0.12 
0.71 5 0.06 
0.5 15 1.75 
0.5 10 1.07 
0.5 5 0.40 
0.2 15 7.54 
0.2 10 3.74 
0.2 5 0.06 
0.1 15 8.60 
0.1 10 0.13 
0.1 5 9.08 
1/15 15 0.18 
1/15 10 14.39 
1/15 5 28.23 
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Table 7 shows that ( )mσ  is below 30%, particularly when EIS is around 
either 1/RRA or 0.7. Parameterizing EIS with values around these two levels, 
the model produces low IIRS as well as low ( )mσ , with the latter being even 
lower than the Hansen-Jagannathan lower bound. Therefore, with EIS around 
either 1/RRA or 0.7, the model produced results that cannot be reconciled 
with asset prices data. In order for our model to produce satisfactory results 
on both quantity variables and asset prices, we instead parameterized EIS 
with values neither around 1/RRA nor around 0.7. With these new EIS values, 
our model produces levels of international risk sharing that reaches levels 
always over 96%. So far, our results demonstrate that a theoretical model 
that is able to successfully reconcile both quantity data and asset price data 
also produces very high levels of international risk sharing, a result contrary 
to that of the benchmark model.    
   5. Conclusion 
This is a theoretical paper on the study of international risk sharing and its 
implications for equity home bias. Despite adopting the model of closed 
economies and autarkic asset holdings—a scenario leading to the lowest level 
of international risk sharing under the same conditions—our model is still 
able to generate international risk sharing indexes always over 96% for a 
broad range of parameter values. However, there are two exceptions: the 
case in which the value of EIS is around the reciprocal of RRA and the case in 
which it is around 0.7. In those cases, the risk sharing index drops sharply to 
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about 30%. This result sheds light on why the benchmark model featuring a 
power utility whereby EIS is the reciprocal of RRA generates an international 
risk sharing value as low as 30%. Using asset market data to build the 
Hansen-Jagannathan lower bound for the volatility of the logarithms of IMRS, 
we can exclude EIS at values around either 1/RRA or 0.7, since it is at those 
values that the model produced the volatility even smaller than the lower 
bound. In addition, our model’s consumption results fit well with the actual 
consumption data.    
The implication of the high international risk sharing generated in closed 
economy model with long run risk is that the low proportion of foreign assets 
in a domestic agent’s portfolio, a phenomenon observed in the data, might 
not be a puzzle or a departure from the agent's first-order condition. After all, 
risk has already been well shared internationally due to the high correlations 
across countries of long-run productivity shocks. Hence, there is not much 
incentive left for an agent to hold foreign assets in her portfolio in order to 
further share risk internationally. Therefore, equity home bias might not be a 
puzzle as claimed by the benchmark model, in the sense that it can be well 
reconciled with the theoretical result of our model. 
Following the practices found in the long-run literature, our model could 
be extended by introducing time-varying productivity volatility. We can then 
determine whether our results for international risk sharing will be robust 
under the introduction of stochastic volatility.  
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Appendix 
1. Consumer’s problem: 
Consumer’s FOC:  ( )( )11 , 1 , 1 1,i itt c t j ti
t
CE R R
C
− −+ + +
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥ =⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
θ
ψ θθβ  
2. Firm’s problem (with adjustment cost) 
Firm’s FOC: 
1
s
s
s
q
I
K
= ⎛ ⎞′Ψ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
( ) 11s s sW Z Kα αα −= −  
 
( ) 1
11 1 1
1 1 1
11
1
1 s
s s s
s s s
s ss
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I
K I IR Z K
K KI
K
α α
δ
α
+
+− − ++ + +
++
+
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞− + Ψ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎛ ⎞⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥ ′= + − Ψ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎛ ⎞ ⎝ ⎠′Ψ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
   (B1) 
 
The log productivity growth evolution process: 
{ }1 1 1 ,, , , ,i i i i i it t t t t x tz x w x x i h f+ + −∆ = µ + + = + ∀ ∈ρ ε  
3. Market clearing conditions: 
( )1 1, 1tt t t t t t t t
t
IY C I Z K K K K
K
δ−α α + ⎛ ⎞= + = = Ψ + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠              
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4. Log-linear approximation of FOC around the steady state 
( )1 1t t t t t tC I C Cz k c i c iY Y Y Yα
⎛ ⎞− α = + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠+ + =  
( )
1
1 1 1
t t t t t
G gk i k i k
G G g g+
− − δ − δ + δ − δ= 1+ 1+= + +  
( )
( )
2
1 1 2
2
1
1 (1 ) (1 )(1
( )(1 ) ( )(1 )
1 (1 ) (1 )(1
( )(1 ) ( )(1 )
t t t t
t
Y g Y gr z k k
r K g r K g r
Y g Y g k
r K g r K g r
ζ ζ ζ
ζ ζ ζ
+ + +
+
α − α ⎡ ⎤+ ++ + α + − δ)⎢ ⎥1+ + δ + + δ +⎣ ⎦
⎧ ⎫α − α ⎡ ⎤+ +− + + α + − δ)⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥1+ + δ + + δ +⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
=
 
1 1 1 ,,
i i i i i i
t t t t t x tz x w x x+ + −∆ = µ + + = +ρ ε  
5. The method of undetermined coefficients (state variables are tk , tx  and 
( )t tw z∆ .)  
( ) 1
1
11 1 1
1
t t t t t t t
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C C C C gz k c i c k k
Y Y Y Y g g
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+
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⎧ ⎫1− δ + 1− ρ +⎡ ⎤1+⎪ ⎪+ − α + + −⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥+ δ + δ⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
⎡ ⎤2 + − δ 1++ + −⎢ ⎥+ δ + δ⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤1− δ 2 + − δ 1++ + + + −⎢ ⎥+ δ + δ + δ⎣ ⎦
ε
tk
⎧ ⎫⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭
        (B2) 
6. The return on the consumption asset: , 1c tr +  
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, 1 0 1 , 1 , 1
,
, log ,
c t c t c t t t
c t
c t
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r n n p p c c
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+ + += + − + −
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
 
where ,c tP  is the price of the asset which pays the aggregate consumption as 
its dividend for each period; 1n  is the parameter of linearization defined by 
( )1
1
1 exp
Pn
c p P C
= =+ − + .  
, 0 1 2 3c t t t tp A A k A x A w= + + +  
( )
( )
, 1 1 2 1 1 3 1
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⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤2 + − δ 1++ − + − α + + −⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥+ δ + δ⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤2 + − δ 1++ − + + −⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥+ δ + δ⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
+ − + + kk kk tY I g I gv v kg C C g C gα
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤1− δ 2 + − δ 1++ + −⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥+ δ + δ + δ⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
  (B3) 
7. Solution to 1tm +   
Since consumption asset is one kind of assets, it should satisfy the following 
FOC condition: 1 , 1 0t t c tE m r+ +⎡ ⎤+ =⎣ ⎦ . with recursive preferences, 
( ) ( )1 1 , 1t t t c tm c c r+ + +θ= − − + θ −1ψ   (B4).   
Hence: 
( ) ( ) ( )1 , 1 , 1 1 , 10, 0t t t c t c t t t t c tE c c r r E c c r+ + + + +⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤θ θ− − + θ −1 + = − − + θ =⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ψ ψ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  
 
If we assume homoskedasity, the following equation holds true: 
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[ ]1 , 1 0t t t t c tE c c E r+ +θ ⎡ ⎤− − + θ =⎣ ⎦ψ      (B5) 
Then we get: 
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Substituting 1A , 2A  and 3A  into Equation (B3), we get: 
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          (B7) 
Substituting Equations (B2) and (B7) into (B4), we get: 
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         (B8) 
8. Solutions to kkv , kxv , and kwv  
We are half done. Equations (B2) and (B8) express 1t tc c+ −  and 1tm +  as 
functions of both parameters and kkv , kxv , kwv . Next, we solve kkv , kxv , kwv  as 
functions of parameters.  
 
From Equation (B1), we express the investment return 1tr +  as follows: 
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 (B9) 
The investment return also satisfies the FOC condition: [ ]1 1 0t t tE m r+ ++ = . In 
the case of homoskedacity, we get: 1 1 0t t t tE m E r+ ++ =  
The coefficient of tx  in [ ]1 1t t tE m r+ ++  is: 
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  (B10) 
 
The coefficient of tw  in [ ]1 1t t tE m r+ ++  is: 0kwv =  (B11) 
The coefficient of tk  in [ ]1 1t t tE m r+ ++  is: 
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(B12) 
 
From Equation (B12), we get solution to kkv  as a function of model’s 
parameters.  
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Solution to kxv  is delivered by substituting kkv  into Equation (B10). 
9. Solutions to 1tm +  and 1t tc c+ −  as functions of model’s parameters:  
Finally, substituting kkv , kxv , kwv  into Equations (B8) and (B2), we can 
express 1t tc c+ −  and 1tm +  as functions of model’s parameters. 
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